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1956] RECENT DECISIONS 577 
TAXATION-FEDERAL ESTATE TAX-INCLUDIBILITY OF ACCUMULATED IN-
COME OF TRUST WHERE CoRPus INCLUDED IN GRoss ESTATE-Decedent created 
eight inter vivos trusts for the benefit of his immediate family, reserving 
the power as trustee to invade the corpus in unusual circumstances for the 
benefit of the beneficiaries, and to accumulate all or part of the income 
and add it to the corpus. The Commissioner included both the corpus 
and the accumulated income in the decedent's gross estate. The Tax Court 
held that the corpus was properly included, but not the accumulated in-
come.1 On appeal by the Commissioner, held, affirmed. The accumulated 
income of the trusts should not be included in the decedent's gross estate 
as it was not "property ..• of which the decedent has at any time made 
a transfer" within the language of the taxing statute.2 Commissioner v. 
McDermott's Estate, (7th Cir. 1955) 222 F. (2d) 665. 
The court in the principal case had respectable though somewhat sparse 
authority on which to base its decision. In Burns v. Commissioner3 and 
Commissioner v. Gidwit:t: Estate,4 it was held that the accumulated income 
of a trust was not includible in the decedent's gross estate because it was 
not transferred by him, although in both cases the trust corpus was in-
cluded as a transfer made in contemplation of death. There are two Tax 
Court decisions to the contrary,~ and the only distinguishing feature is 
that in the latter two cases the corpus was included because of a reserved 
power or interest. There have been several attempts to reconcile the 
apparent conflict. One approach has been that the distinction lies in the 
point of time at which the transfer becomes complete. In the contempla-
122 P-H T.C. Mem. 1J53,154 (1953). 
2 I.R.C. (1939), §§811 (c)(l)(B)(ii), 811 (d)(l); now I.R.C. (1954), §§2036 (a)(2), 
2038 (a) (1 ). 
8 (5th Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 739, noted in 50 CoL. L. REv. 391 (1950). 
4 (7th Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 813. 
5 Estate of Yawkey, 12 T.C. 1164 (1949); Estate of Showers, 14 T.C. 902 (1950). These 
decisions relied primarily on authority holding that property included in a decedent's 
gross estate is valued at the death of the donor and not at the time of the inter vivos 
transfers. Igleheart v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1935) 77 F. (2d) 704; Kroger v. Com-
missioner, (6th Cir. 1944) 145 F. (2d) 901, cert. den. 324 U.S. 866, 65 S.Ct. 915 (1945); 
Humphrey's Estate v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 1, cert. den. 332 U.S. 
817, 68 S.Ct. 157 (1947). 
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tion of death cases it is when the original gift is made, while in the re-
served power cases the crucial time is not until the settlor's death.6 An-
other argument has been that the difference lies between gifts in trust 
and outright gifts.7 Both arguments meet with the same obstacle, for, in 
so far as the transfer is included in the decedent's gross estate, the valuation 
is made at the time of the donor's death, regardless of the kind of transfer 
involved.8 Another possibility for reconciliation of the authorities is to 
draw the distinction on the basis of what is to be valued and included, 
in addition to the transferred corpus. Along with the corpus, there are 
three types of property that might be included: an increase in value of 
the original assets;9 capital gains realized on the sale or exchange of orig-
inal assets;10 and accumulated income. That the first two should be in-
cluded in the gross estate is fairly well settled, for, in the first, the in-
crease in value is still part of the original property transferred, within the 
language of the code, and in the second the new assets are merely substi-
tutes for the original property transferred and are directly traceable to it. 
Quite a different situation exists in the case of accumulated income which 
was neither transferred originally nor a mere substitute for the subject 
matter of the original transfer.11 The distinction between increase in value 
and capital gains on the one hand and accumulated income on the other 
6 Estate of Showers, note 5 supra, and other cases discussed in MoNTGOMERY's FED-
ERAL TAXES, ESTATES, TRUSTS AND GIFIS 606-611 (1951). 
:l' lt is true that in most cases there will be no accumulated income in an outright 
gift, but the proponents of this view consider the instant problem in conjunction with 
that of an in.crease in value of property originally transferred. See 96 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 
706 (1948). The English courts seem to follow this distinction. Attorney General v. 
Oldham, [1940] 2 K.B. 485; In re Payne, [1940°] I Ch. 576. 
s I.R.C. (1939), §811; now I.R.C. (1954), §2031 (a); Treas. Reg. 105, §81.15 (c); Igle-
heart v. Commissioner, note 5 supra; Kroger v. Commissioner, note 5 supra; Humphrey's 
Estate v. Commissioner, note 5 supra. Many courts and writers have approached the 
problem as essentially one of valuation. See Pavenstedt, "Taxation of Transfers in Con-
templation of Death: A Proposal for Abolition," 54 YALE L. J. 70, 87 (1944); MoNT· 
GOMERY'S FEDERAL TAXES, ESTATES, GIFIS AND TRusrs 530 (1946); 61 HARv. L. REv. 891 
(1948). 
9 Kroger v. Commissioner, note 5 supra. See also Liebmann v. Hassett, (1st Cir. 1945) 
148 F. (2d) 247; Estate of Vanderlip, 3 T.C. 358 (1944). The latter two cases involved the 
valuation of life insurance policies transferred inter vivos but included in the trans-
feror's gross estate. 
il.O Estate of Guggenheim, 40 B.T.A. 181 (1939), mod. (2d Cir. 1941) 117 F. (2d) 469, 
cert. den. 314 U.S. 621, 62 S.Ct. 66 (1941). In Commissioner v. Hager's Estate, (3d Cir. 
1949) 173 F. (2d) 613, cert. dismissed 337 U.S. 937, 69 S.Ct. 1515 (1949), accumulated 
income of a trust was included with the corpus, as well as capital gains, but the court 
did not dwell on the question or give any reasons for the inclusion of either the income 
or the gains. 
11 An argument can be made that the right to future income is an incident of the 
transferred property and ought to be included with such property, the right being 
measured by the amount of income accumulated. The difficulty with this approach is 
that the same theory should apply to distributed income, which would clearly not be 
included, and it is unlikely that such an extended meaning of the word "property" was 
intended by Congress. 
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can be applied to reconcile all of the cases except two12 and may be helpful 
as a future guide. It is true that the purpose of the federal estate tax is to 
tax those transfers which are testamentary in character and treat them as 
if they were made at death instead of during life, and that exclusion of 
accumulated income may open the way for possible tax avoidance.13 How-
ever, in view of the crucial language of the statute, stressing the necessity 
of a transfer,14 the decision in the principal case was inevitable. 
Neil Flanagin, S.Ed. 
!12 Estate of Yawkey, note 5 supra; Estate of Showers, note 5 supra. 
13 The Commissioner claimed that this was in fact the situation in the principal 
case. It was maintained that the decedent created the inter vivos trusts by transferring 
stock in a wholly owned corporation and then causing the only dividend to be declared 
on such stock. Commissioner's brief on appeal, p. 28. 
14 I.R.C. (1939), §§8ll (c) (1) (B) (ii), 8ll (d) (l); now I.R.C. (1954), §§2036 (a) (2), 
2038 (a) (1). The following language of Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 at lll, 60 S.Ct. 
444 (1940), has been quoted in support of including accumulated trust income: "The 
taxable event is the transfer inter vivos. But the measure of the tax is the value of 
the transferred property at the time when death brings it into enjoyment." By placing 
the emphasis on the words "transferred property" the quotation supports the opposite 
result. 
